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ABSTRACT
OBJECTIVE: To analyze the process of implementation of emergency care units in Brazil. 
METHODS: We have carried out a documentary analysis, with interviews with twenty-four state 
urgency coordinators and a panel of experts. We have analyzed issues related to policy background 
and trajectory, players involved in the implementation, expansion process, advances, limits, 
and implementation difficulties, and state coordination capacity. We have used the theoretical 
framework of the analysis of the strategic conduct of the Giddens theory of structuration. 
RESULTS: Emergency care units have been implemented after 2007, initially in the Southeast 
region, and 446 emergency care units were present in all Brazilian regions in 2016. Currently, 620 
emergency care units are under construction, which indicates expectation of expansion. Federal 
funding was a strong driver for the implementation. The states have planned their emergency 
care units, but the existence of direct negotiation between municipalities and the Union has 
contributed with the significant number of emergency care units that have been built but that 
do not work. In relation to the urgency network, there is tension with the hospital because of 
the lack of beds in the country, which generates hospitalizations in the emergency care unit. The 
management of emergency care units is predominantly municipal, and most of the emergency 
care units are located outside the capitals and classified as Size III. The main challenges identified 
were: under-funding and difficulty in recruiting physicians. 
CONCLUSIONS: The emergency care unit has the merit of having technological resources and 
being architecturally differentiated, but it will only succeed within an urgency network. Federal 
induction has generated contradictory responses, since not all states consider the emergency 
care unit a priority. The strengthening of the state management has been identified as a challenge 
for the implementation of the urgency network.
DESCRIPTORS: Emergency Medical Services, Manpower. Health Manager. Health Services 
Administration. Resources Management. Health Management. Health Policy. 
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INTRODUCTION
In the early 2000s, the Ministry of Health set up a national urgency care policy, with the 
implementation of new components such as emergency mobile services (SAMU) and 
emergency care units (UPA). The pre-hospital implementation was a good decision, 
as national9,12,15 and international experiences2,21 show the positive impact of this care. 
Chronologically, the implementation of the pre-hospital components occurred separately15, 
in three different moments10: until 2002 – initial regulation, 2003–2008 – emphasis on the 
SAMU, after 2009 – emphasis on the UPA. In 2011, the need for an urgency network was 
defined, with regionalization and reorganization of pre-existing services13.
The UPA, the main fixed component of pre-hospital urgency, are intermediate units between 
primary care and hospital emergencies. They are classified in three different sizes, according 
to the population covered, the physical area, the number of available beds, the management 
of persons, and the capacity to care14.
The ordinances edited over the years have provided for UPA that are strategically integrated 
into urgency care networks6. The necessary coexistence with the SAMU and the requirement 
to expand the primary health care coverage with the Family Health Strategy (FHS) are 
conditionalities that seek to strengthen the network vision and impel managers to invest in 
other components of the urgency network. This is how the intended resolution of the UPA is 
demarcated, differentiating them from the early emergency rooms, producers of “emergency 
appointments” that are little resolutive6.
A national research3 has identified that all UPA classify risk and are structurally well-equipped. 
The main challenges found included the professional management and the “hospitalization” 
of patients3. Rio de Janeiro, the first state to implement UPA before the federal ordinances 
and creator of the name, built its park of units counting on a convergence of interests that 
has allowed its rapid expansion9. This state rapidly expanded the UPA without effective 
organization of the urgency network7. Another research has evidenced the limits in the 
management of the health work, expressed in the types of hiring, setting, and qualification 
of the professionals in the UPA11 with implications in the quality of the care. Despite the 
difficulties presented in the studies7,9,11, the UPA represented an increase in access to medical 
appointments and complementary tests, especially in less complex cases7.
The aim of this research was to analyze the implementation process of the UPA in Brazil, 
identifying the rules and resources that facilitated its implementation, the obstacles and 
facilitators in this process, the influence of the agents of the different governmental spheres 
in the implantation of these services, and the proposed expansion of the UPA.
METHODS
We carried out an analysis of the official legislation, documents, and websites of the 
municipalities, states, and federation, as well as interviews with key players and a panel of experts.
We interviewed state emergency care coordinators who participated in a panel of experts. 
These players were chosen because of their importance for the integral assistance to urgencies, 
the negotiation of pacts and goals, and the cooperation between federative entities. In total, 
24 Brazilian state coordinators agreed to participate. The interviews were based on a semi-
structured guide and took place in 2013 and 2014. The panel of experts collectively addressed the 
same subjects of the interviews, providing the opportunity to share experiences. The panel took 
place in two days (16 hours) at the end of 2013 and was attended by the urgency and emergency 
general coordinator of the Ministry of Health and three members of the Brazilian Emergency 
Cooperation Network (RBCE), a key institution in the formulation and implementation of 
the policy of urgency, in addition to the interviewed players. The material of the panel and 
interviews were analyzed together, considering: policy background and trajectory, players 
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involved in the implementation, expansion process, advances, limits, and implementation 
difficulties, and state coordination capacity. The documents made up the rules and resources 
available for the action of the players involved. The analysis plan aimed to identify the structural 
circumstances available for the action of managers and the strategies that differentiated the 
states, characterizing the implementation of the UPA in Brazil.
We used the theoretical framework of the analysis of the strategic conduct of the Giddens 
Theory of Structuration5, according to which social practices can be understood as skillful 
procedures, methods, or techniques performed by social agents, using structural rules 
and resources5. Structural dimensions (the power base) are either facilitative or restrictive, 
and agents access them to manipulate and influence social interactions. There are three 
types of structuration, correlating the cognitive capacities of the agents and the structural 
characteristics: meaning, which is enabled by communication from an interpretive plan, 
domination, which depends on the mobilization of allocative and authoritarian resources, 
and legitimacy, exercised from the sanction of standards5.
This project was approved by CAAE 0209.0.031.000-11.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We analyzed the ordinances regarding the formulation of the Urgency Policy. The Ministry 
of Health provided a report that informed the sphere responsible for the management of 
the UPA and we consulted the webpage of the Strategic Management Support Room of the 
Ministry of Health, which are the main sources of descriptive quantitative data.
History of the Fixed Pre-hospital Care
For decades, the fixed pre-hospital care was mainly assumed by municipal managers who 
performed this care role in different ways. Large urban centers were the precursors, with 
units open to spontaneous demand, but with predominant structure and equipment for 
low complexity care.
We highlight the emergency care services (SPA), the immediate care units (UAI), the medical 
emergency services (PAM), the municipal urgency and emergency centers (CMUM), and the 
regional health centers (CRS). The outpatient medical care units (AMA) of the municipality 
of São Paulo represented one of the alternatives prior to the UPA. The AMA aimed to 
broaden the access of the population with acute conditions of low and medium complexity 
to integrate them into primary care19. However, we identified a predominance of units with 
unsatisfactory integration19.
Before the UPA, there was a network for fixed pre-hospital that was not regulated by the 
Government, which fulfilled its role without systematic evaluation. Most of the time, these 
units were not expressive in structural terms, did not classify risk, and produced little 
resolutive appointments.
Although they are not pre-hospital units, small hospitals eventually had this role, especially 
in small municipalities and in the countryside. Unable to fulfill their function as an inpatient 
unit, because of deficiencies in the structure and human resources, in some places, small 
hospitals only provided care of spontaneous demand, confirming their idleness20.
The federal resource and the rule for structural definition were inductors for the UPA. 
However, municipal and state agents had already defined their strategies to set up the fixed 
pre-hospital urgency.
Implementation and Expansion of the UPA
The implementation of the UPA began with an ordinance in 2008. The state of Rio de Janeiro 
was the pioneer in this process, implementing the first UPA in the country in 2007, before 
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federal regulation. In this state, the UPA was prioritized in the governmental agenda by a 
confluence of historical-structural, political-institutional, and situational factors that made 
possible the implantation before federal incentives9.
According to normative definitions for the implementation of UPA, there was a requirement 
for the presence of a SAMU, a reference hospital network, and primary care with 50% coverage 
or in development, in municipalities with at least 50,000 inhabitants.
Most UPA are concentrated in municipalities with more than one million inhabitants, with 
the privilege of regions with better socioeconomic conditions and better provision of services, 
such as the Southeast region3.
Table 1 shows the expansion of the APU in Brazil between 2011 and 2016. We chose this 
period as it characterizes the beginning of federal induction from the Growth Acceleration 
Program (PAC). Up to 2011, the UPA were concentrated in the Southeast region. In 2016, 
Table 1. Number of existing UPA, UPA under construction, and UPA built but not working, by federative unit. Brazil, 2011 and 2016. 
Federative units 
2011
Existing UPA
2016
UPA 
built but not working Existing UPA
UPA
under construction
UPA
under construction
North Region
Acre 2 1 2 5 0 
Amapá 0 3 1 3 0 
Amazonas 0 9 1 4 0 
Pará* 1 20 11 40 13 
Rondônia 0 3 2 7 2 
Roraima 0 1 0 1 0 
Tocantins* 2 4 6 7 4 
Total 5 41 23 67 19 
Northeast Region
Alagoas 0 6 8 8 2 
Bahia 1 32 29 52 12 
Ceará 0 19 26 26 9 
Maranhão 1 7 11 17 3 
Paraíba 1 6 10 18 2 
Pernambuco 14 6 18 28 7 
Piauí* 0 3 2 12 3 
Rio Grande do Norte 3 6 6 11 2 
Sergipe 0 0 4 7 0 
Total 20 85 114 179 40 
Midwest Region
Federal District 1 8 6 4 0 
Goiás* 1 17 14 34 12 
Mato Grosso* 0 8 4 23 2 
Mato Grosso do Sul 0 4 7 7 2 
Total 2 37 31 68 16 
Southeast Region
Espírito Santo 1 5 4 8 0 
Minas Gerais 8 43 45 47 10 
Rio de Janeiro 43 16 70 12 2 
São Paulo 13 95 99 145 19 
Total 65 159 218 212 31 
South Region
Paraná 9 22 34 30 6 
Santa Catarina* 2 12 10 21 6 
Rio Grande do Sul* 0 26 16 43 16 
Total 11 60 60 94 28 
Total Brazil 101 381 446 620 134 
Source: Department of Hospital Care and Urgency (DAHU)/Ministry of Health and Strategic Management Support Room (SAGE), 2011 and 2016. 
UPA: emergency care units
* States with an expressive number of UPA not working, probably because some are newly built and still have no working conditions from the lack of 
professionals and materials. 
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we have an expressive number of UPA throughout the country. Of the 485 UPA in 2011 (sum 
of those built and under construction), 446 are ready and in operation since 2016. By 2016 
there was still an expectation of expansion – 620 UPA were under construction –, despite 
the 132 that were built but which did not work. São Paulo has the largest park of UPA in 
operation, under construction, and not working. Proportionally, the North and Midwest 
regions have the largest number of UPA not working, considering the total in operation. The 
North was conservative in the implementation and expansion of UPA, with the exception 
of the state of Pará.
According to the interviewees, some factors explain this scenario of varied expansion in 
Brazil: divergence between political interests and technical criteria, financial or operational 
difficulties at the municipal level, such as hiring doctors, lack of funding resources with federal 
payment, difficulty in the regionalization of municipal UPA, projects of UPA that later proved 
to be a mistake from the lack of planning, and lack of credibility of the UPA and state support.
There was unanimity about the lack of federal resources for implementation and costing, 
the latter theoretically shared between state and municipality.
The PAC 1 and PAC 2 were important sources of financing for the expansion of the UPA. In 
PAC 2, some municipalities were selected regardless of the regional urgency plans. According 
to the state coordinators, the attempt to regionalize the urgency was compromised when 
the state was removed from the expansion process, as in the following statement: “I think 
it was an interference that produced some expectations... the municipality says I want my 
own UPA... it weakened the technical part a bit... the policy that financed PAC 2 defined the 
expansion” (E14).
Other states were better able to act as coordinator of municipal demands: “I received several 
letters from the lower house requesting an UPA for the municipality... I always gave the same 
answer... the criterion is technical, the need of the region” ( E9).
Federal induction also produced the transformation of services previously financed by states 
or municipalities into UPA. “The SPA (emergency care services) are 100% funded by the state. 
They will receive federal resource when they become UPA” (E3).
There was a coordinator who was unfavorable to the implementation of the UPA component 
in the urgency network, which did not prevent its implementation. Others recognized the 
suitability and purpose of the UPA. “I think the UPA is fundamental for the network” (E22).
The state of São Paulo illustrates a peculiarity, since its park of UPA is located outside the 
capital, evidencing the independence of the municipal level.
State managers were emphatic in stating that the expansion of the number of UPA, more than 
the initial implementation, was a federal ambition. “I think we are in a very good number. 
Not their expansion, but making them work is the biggest challenge with the articulation 
with the municipal system in which they are inserted” (E16).
The UPA, unlike SAMU15, did not respond to a substantive care gap for the urgency network. 
Its implementation depended more on the federal financial incentive, which, because it was 
expensive to the municipalities, produced some frustrating capacities of responses, in the 
conception of the managers.
The municipal manager relied on the federal entity for the expansion of the UPA and most 
of the state managers felt powerless in the execution of their state urgency plans.
The Structural Conditions for the Care
The main characteristic of the UPA is the adequacy of its structure, the comfort of the 
facilities, and the suitability of the equipment. For the first time, a component of the SUS was 
proposed with great exigency in the structural criteria. This was an expressive differential, 
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according to the interviewees, in relation to the existing emergency care park. “It evolved 
from the model of ER that had no resolutiveness, physical space, qualified team, material, 
or medication” (E7).
There was reference to the sufficiency of laboratory diagnostic resources and access to 
imaging resources, as observed in a national research3. However, the maintenance of the UPA 
eventually became a problem. “Lack of maintenance of the equipment ends up undermining 
the physical structure” (E16).
Information systems were mentioned as a structural problem. “The UPA are not computerized. 
They make manual reports of the care type” (E13).
However, the most striking structural issue was the lack of professionals. “The bottleneck 
is the human resources” (E16).
This problem had been identified nationally3. The low qualification of the professionals was 
exposed by the fact that 34% of the physicians did not have any qualification to act in the UPA. 
In addition, the size of the number of professionals fell short of the demand3. Another study 
has identified selection and fixation problems, predominance of young and inexperienced 
professionals, high turnover of physicians, and UPA seen as temporary work11.
The problems indicated by these studies were recognized by the interviewees, who also 
highlighted the incipient qualification and issues with the type of employment of professionals. 
“Physicians come from the FHS with no experience. Difficulty of training” (E4). “You have 
public workers from the municipality, borrowed from the state, those hired, it is a mixture” (E7).
The federal entity was the protagonist of a proposal of a structurally differentiated unit. 
However, none of the three government levels was able to positively equate the management 
of persons.
The UPA and other Components of the Emergency Network
Table 1 presents and analyzes how UPA worked together with the primary care and the 
hospital. We highlight the following functions for the UPA: to complement primary care, to 
complement the hospital emergency, and to function as an inpatient unit.
The fixed pre-hospital component was regulated as an integral part of the primary care. As 
its implantation mainly occurred to unburden the hospitals, many managers understood 
the UPA as complementary to the hospital, as already evidenced7.
Most of the care services were classified as blue or green, that is, of low severity, as already 
identified in local7,9,16 and national studies3. There is no contradiction in the predominance 
of less severe urgencies in pre-hospital units. However, as we have already indicated7,16, the 
interviewees stated that the expectation of professionals is to treat primarily critical patients. 
The preponderance of less critical patients was understood as a deficiency of the primary care.
Considering that the FHS coverage in the country reached 61% in 2015, the interviewees 
evaluated that the UPA were not effectively related to primary care.
Some of them argued that the UPA would have less purpose if the primary care were better 
structured. “Dispensable if there is good primary care coverage” (E9).
Despite the impact of insufficient primary care in the UPA, the impact of the lack of hospitals 
is more serious, which has generated some distortions. “Some managers think that the UPA 
solves the shortage of hospitals” (E10).
Two serious problems can be identified in the Brazilian hospital park: a concentration of 
beds in small hospitals and a tendency to reduce the already undersized number of beds. The 
number of beds in the SUS decreased (10.5%) from 2005 to 20144. In 2014, the SUS had 1.56 
beds per 1,000 inhabitants, which is less than the parameter suggested by the Ministry of 
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Health (MH) of 2.5 to three beds per 1,000 inhabitants, and which is still quite conservative4. 
“Instead of opening doors, policy should qualify them and increase beds” (E16).
Despite the mandatory hospital referral, the difficulty of hospitalizing patients was considered 
the greatest challenge for the UPA.
The permanence of patients for more than 24 hours in the UPA because of the lack of beds 
impacts the quality of care3. A transfer that is longer than four hours for a hospital bed 
aggravates the condition of the patient8. This long stay is a relevant issue, which reflects the 
difficulties of the hospital network and we highlighted it in  1, when indicating the risk of 
hospitalization of patients in the UPA.
In addition to the absolute deficit of beds, most of these beds are in small hospitals, with low 
resolution capacity and low occupancy rates. However, these beds are accounted for, despite 
the technical insufficiency to use them4. The problem is not restricted to smaller hospitals. 
It also reaches hospitals with more than one hundred beds, which are the main referrals for 
UPA. The managers knew this reality well. “We have problems with length of stay in large 
hospitals. We need to train the head on duty, clinical coordinators, break feuds” (E11).
The low supply of reference beds for the UPA has generated distortions. Some managers 
treated the more complex beds in the red room as hospital beds.
Strategies to address the problem were identified, which ranged from differentiated financial 
transfer up to the strengthening of the management of small and philanthropic hospitals. “There 
were contracts with philanthropic network beds. Resources for new beds and qualified beds” (E11).
At the federal level, initiatives to address the hospital problem are still frustrated. The 
consequence is overcrowding in hospital emergencies of the major hospitals of reference. 
This overcrowding generates pressure from the entrance1 and UPA may be essential because 
it is another open access option. Another component of overcrowding1, the capacity of a 
hospital to absorb the patient from the emergency, releasing beds, impacts the UPA, which 
needs this bed.
Box 1. Analysis of the integration of the UPA with other components of the network. 
Situation identified in the UPA Evaluation of interviewees Our analysis 
To meet low and medium severity 
urgencies complementarily to 
primary care 
The quantitative and qualitative 
insufficiency of the primary care 
produces this pattern of care. The UPA has its function in the 
low severity care as it works 24 
hours, complementing primary 
care. However, it should not be 
implanted to replace primary care. 
“UPA meet outpatient clinic 
situations in most cases” (E5) They indicate that the non-
investment in primary care has 
been replaced by UPA.
“Patients of the UPA should be in 
PC. Government should decide to 
invest in PC” (E22)
To be complementary to hospital 
emergency The UPA were implemented to 
replace hospital emergency rooms 
and, in smaller municipalities, to 
replace inefficient hospitals. 
The meeting of the low-risk 
demand in pre-hospital units may 
benefit the hospital emergency that 
should prioritize the more complex 
cases. However, that is not the 
purpose of the UPA. 
“UPA are close to hospitals to 
replace the ER of the hospital” (E8)
To work as an inpatient unit 
The interviewees are against the 
“hospitalization” in the UPA. 
However, they admit that some 
managers count the beds of 
the red room as hospital beds, 
including ICU. 
The only role of the UPA in the 
care of the critical patient is his or 
her stabilization. The UPA is 24h 
because it is open uninterruptedly 
and not because it can tolerate 
the patient’s stay for 24 hours 
awaiting beds. 
“UPA should not work as a hospital 
of low resoluteness because of the 
lack of beds” (E9) 
“Patient admitted to the UPA and 
UPA do not receive AIH” (E13)
“UPA do well: they meet the low 
complexity, refer to the average, 
stabilize the serious condition, but 
hospitalization is bad” (E14)
UPA: emergency care unit; PC: primary care; ER: emergency room; AIH: Hospitalization Authorization; ICU: 
Intensive Care Center
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The structural difficulties of primary and hospital care did not favor the configuration of an 
urgency network to which the UPA was integrated.
The Management of the UPA and the Interaction between Federated Entities
Box 2 illustrates how municipal and state players mobilized resources, legitimized, and 
signified the UPA as components of the urgency network, building new contexts5, in which 
the UPA can be implemented from state plans in agreement with the municipality or 
from autonomous municipal decision. We could see that the significance of the UPA as 
a structuring modality did not correspond to the expectation of a component that was 
integrated into the urgency network, but it meant a new access to the system. It was 
legitimized when it was identified as a fundamental component capable of fulfilling one 
of its functions, which is to be complementary to primary care. The domination structure 
showed that the mobilization of material and authoritative capacities generated a 
pattern of implementation that was sometimes more political than technical, with little 
state governance.
Regarding the management entity of the UPA, most of the UPA in the Brazilian regions are 
under municipal management, except in the Northeast. Therefore, the main institutional 
player of the management was the Municipal Health Department, as already evidenced3. The 
explanation has been agreements made directly between municipalities and the Ministry 
of Health. “We have UPA that come from the network and UPA that the mayor goes to the 
MH and says: ‘I want an UPA’ and the UPA comes.” (E15)
Even the planned UPA are often not under state management by manager choice. “The state 
wants to assume what is from the state, the hospitals.” (E15)
Box 2. Analysis of the structuring types and action of federative entities according to the scenario found and the statements of managers. 
Category of the structuring theory Scenario found Statements of managers 
Structuring types 
Meaning – reflects an 
interpretive plan 
UPA as a component that enables access 
versus 
UPA as a component 
isolated on the network 
“It must give access, meet the low complexity, 
refer to the average, stabilize the serious 
condition” (E10 and E14) 
“A backset because it is isolated. It breaks the PC 
model” (E9) 
Legitimacy – 
compliance with 
standards 
UPA as an integrated component in the network, 
according to ordinances 
“I think the UPA is fundamental for the network” 
(E22) 
“Professionals understand the importance 
of meeting the urgency of low complexity, 
complementarily to PC” (E15) 
Domination – 
mobilization of 
allocative (material 
capacities) and 
authoritative resources 
(relation between 
persons) 
Implementation of required units 
versus 
Political implementation 
“There is political articulation. The state 
government is requesting the UPA together with 
the municipality” (E11) 
“Policy goal of the Office of the President’s Chief 
of Staff for 2013. It asks the MH to execute it 
without the state” (E12) 
Agency – knowledge 
and action of 
institutional players 
Action of the 
municipal player 
Municipal managers using allocative and 
authoritative resources 
“The municipal manager has nowhere to wash 
clothes, make food, and decides to put all 
this in the UPA, handling the financing. The 
manager is changed and the new one does 
not understand why the UPA is so big and 
expensive, a burden for the structure of the 
municipality” (E16) 
“Doctors left with the change of manager. We 
have thrombolytic and the new doctors don’t 
know how to use it” (E5) 
Action of the state 
player 
State managers carry out the urgency plan and 
define their management priorities and needs for 
the state
“State plan to open ICU beds in each health 
region. Consideration of the treasury” (E9)
UPA: emergency care units; PC: Primary Care; MH: Ministry of Health; ICU: Intensive Care Unit
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There was report of transfer of management from the municipality to the state. One 
explanation was the “bankruptcy” of the municipalities in assuming the management of 
the UPA, being necessary to return these units to state management.
We could see the predominance of UPA located in the countryside (Table 2). A national 
study3 indicates the predominance of UPA in populous municipalities. With the current 
concentration in the countryside, we can infer a change in this concentration of UPA in 
large municipalities.
Table 2. Number of UPA by State, location, size, and sphere of management, 2016. 
Federative units Total of UPA
Location Size of UPA Sphere of management
Capital Countryside I II III Municipal State
North Region
Acre 2 2 0 1 0 1 0 2
Amapá 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
Amazonas 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
Pará 11 1 10 2 5 4 11 0
Rondônia 2 2 0 0 2 0 2 0
Roraima 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tocantins 6 3 3 1 5 0 6 0
Total 23 10 13 5 12 6 19 4
Northeast Region
Alagoas 8 1 7 3 3 2 1 7
Bahia 29 8 21 14 6 9 26 3
Ceará 26 9 17 10 8 8 3 23
Maranhão 11 4 7 1 7 3 1 10
Paraíba 10 2 8 6 3 1 6 4
Pernambuco 18 5 13 3 1 14 3 15
Piauí 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
Rio Grande do Norte 6 2 4 2 3 1 5 1
Sergipe 4 0 4 4 0 0 3 1
Total 114 32 82 44 31 39 49 65
Midwest Region
Federal District* 6 6 0 0 6 6
Goiás 14 2 12 4 5 5 14 0
Mato Grosso 4 1 3 2 1 1 4 0
Mato Grosso do Sul 7 4 3 2 2 3 7 0
Total 31 13 18 8 8 15 25 6
Southeast Region
Espírito Santo 4 0 4 0 3 1 4 0
Minas Gerais 45 6 39 11 9 25 45 0
Rio de Janeiro 70 32 38 1 10 59 38 32
São Paulo 99 2 97 39 41 19 99 0
Total 218 40 178 51 63 104 186 32
South Region
Paraná 34 8 26 8 13 13 34 0
Santa Catarina 10 2 8 6 1 3 10 0
Rio Grande do Sul 16 1 15 7 5 4 13 3
Total 60 11 49 21 19 20 57 3
Total Brazil 446 106 340 129 133 184 336 110
Source: Department of Hospital Care and Urgency (DAHU)/Ministry of Health and Strategic Management Support Room (SAGE), 2016. 
UPA: emergency care units
* Federal District: UPA in Brasília is classified as capital and state management to compute the sum. 
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The North and Midwest regions have more balance in UPA located in the capital and in the 
countryside. Most UPA are size III, but there is a national balance between sizes. The North 
region has more size II UPA, and the Northeast has more size I UPA (Table 2).
Regionalization is another fundamental strategy for the countryside where the municipalities 
do not meet the population criterion of 50,000 inhabitants. The sharing of resources has been 
a challenge. “Regional UPA do not exist because only one municipality receives resources 
despite the agreements made” (E8).
Another challenge is to reconcile this component with those before the UPA, with broad 
popular acceptance, regardless of effectiveness. “We have small hospitals in municipalities 
that should not exist. Maybe turn them into UPA. But they can’t close the hospital in the 
municipality with 10,000 or 20,000 inhabitants” (E22).
The state manager builds his or her urgency plans and the municipal manager autonomously 
defines the priorities, but he or she suffers political influence in the defense of local interests17,18.
States had different opinions on the importance of UPA for their networks, and municipalities 
made their choice, but they often did not have the resources to maintain it.
Box 3 presents complementary statements on the categories analyzed.
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
Currently, we face a project of attention to urgencies that seeks to be inclusive; however, its 
implementation occurred in a fragmented way and with fragile articulation among its components.
The federal normative and financial induction generated contradictory responses, in which 
some states consider UPA as a priority and others do not. The current number of UPA under 
construction needs to be reviewed to prevent the increase of UPA that do not work. The 620 
UPA under construction should be analyzed in the management spaces provided for in the 
SUS, as the conducting groups, including the federal entity in the negotiation after planning 
and review of the expansion.
Box 3. Additional statements of managers by analytical category. 
Category Illustrative statements Analytical synthesis
Implantation and 
expansion of 
emergency care 
units (UPA)
“The value that the ministry of health and the state will give ... this cost is still very high for the 
municipality” (E13)
Federal underfunding
“The state is not interested. I think the pre-hospital service it has is enough and one more 
component, the UPA, will not change much” (E9)
Rejection of the state
“I see the UPA as an evolved model of the emergency care that had no resolutiveness. 
From physical space, team qualification, equipment, medication, the UPA model is more 
appropriate” (E7)
Acceptance of the state
Structural conditions 
for care
“Well structured, they improved the working conditions of professionals” (E5)
“We have UPA that are much better than the urgency of the hospital” (E24)
Good structural conditions
“Lack of pediatrician, serious problem” (E13) Lack of medical professionals
The UPA and other 
components of the 
emergency network
“In the countryside, small municipalities have 100% of coverage of the FHS, but the doctors 
attends once, twice a week” (E6)
Difficulty in relation to primary 
care
“The state wanted to have ICU beds in the UPA” (E5) Lack of hospital beds
“Mirror Hospital – metropolitan reference hospital with SH or philanthropic hospital that 
integrate each other to define pharmacy, bed rotation, etc.” (E11)
Strategies to cope with 
difficulties in hospital 
management
Management of 
UPA and interaction 
between federated 
entities
“Regional UPA does not make sense. All municipalities have a small hospital that has to solve 
more than the UPA. The municipality ceases to invest in a service for it to invest in another 
regional hospital that does not have great resolutiveness. It would be different if it were a 
specialized regional hospital that would solve more than the municipality is capable” (E9)
Difficulty of agreement between 
municipalities
“The municipality asked for an UPA in 2009, but gave up and returned the appeal. The state is 
resisting assuming it because the pre-hospital park it has is enough” (E6)
Difficulty of agreement between 
municipality and state
FHS: Family Health Strategy; ICU: intensive treatment unit; SH: small hospital
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The strengthening of the state management was indicated as a challenge for the implementation 
of the network, in addition to underfunding and management of persons.
The access enabled by the UPA was beneficial, even when we consider that its demand 
reflects the incipience of the primary care and the hospital network. This component has 
the merit of having technological resources and being architecturally differentiated, but it 
requires investment in primary care and in hospitals to be successful and integrated into a 
powerful network.
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